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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent accepts the petitioners wording of the question 
presented, that is: 
Does the limited verbal authority given from an owner to a 
supplier, limiting the price and source of materials, preclude a 
third party supplier, unknown to the owner, from enforcing a 
mechanic's lien for the full value of the materials, where the 
original supplier exceeds his authority by obtaining the supplies 
from the third party supplier? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The cover sheet and full text of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Opinion in this case is found in the Appendix hereto and is also 
published in 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Jan. 12, 1989). 
JURISDICTION 
(1) The Court of Appeals opinion in Case No. 870203-CA was 
filed January 12, 1989, and a copy of the opinion was mailed to 
counsel for the parties on January 13, 1989. 
(2) Section 78-2-2, Utah Code, confers upon this Court 
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in this matter. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTE 
Mechanic's Liens Statute. 
Utah Code Section 38-1-3. 
Those entitled to lien - What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any 
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used 
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building 
or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and 
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates 
of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other 
like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered 
service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service tendered, labor performed, 
or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any 
other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the 
owner may have in the property. 
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this petition the respondent accepts the 
statement of the case as set forth by petitioner. A more 
complete version of the facts and case are set forth in the 
respondents1 brief filed with the Court of Appeals which is 
attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS BEEN RULED ON BY THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS 
CONSISTENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
Petitioner apparently seeks a grant of certiorari under 
subpart 4 of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures 
based on the belief that this case involves an important question 
of State Law which has not been but should be settled by the 
Supreme Court. 
The principle question; that is, whether an owner and his 
agent/contractor can restrict by an agreement of their own the 
rights of a third party supplier to file a mechanic's lien, has 
been fully addressed by this court. The case of Interior's 
Contracting, Inc. v Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982) has 
answered that question for cases involving written limitations on 
authority. The Supreme Court held such a written restriction 
could not preclude the statutory protections of the mechanic's 
lien statute for either the agent or those claiming through him. 
-3-
The Court of Appeals has applied that ruling to this case in 
which there is a claim of verbal limitation on the authority of 
the agent/contractor. The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned 
that if, as held in Navalco, supra, a written limitation does not 
per se prohibit lien claims, then certainly the verbal agreement 
could not limit a third party's lien rights. The decision by the 
Court of Appeals is an obvious extensive of the law of Navalcof 
supra, and does not require further elucidation by the Supreme 
Court, 
II. 
THE PETITIONER DOES NOT SEEK REVERSAL TO THE 
COURT OF APPEALS BUT RATHER DEMANDS REVIEW ON CLAIMS 
NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
In their brief, petitioner does not now seek to overturn the 
Court of Appeals rule of law as stated above in favor of the 
decision of the trial court. Rather, petitioner seeks a reversal 
on a new basis not raised before the Court of Appeals. 
Petitioner now claims that under all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the owner's grant of authority to the contractor that 
there was not agency and that this lien must fail. 
Such a review by the Supreme Court is not appropriate under 
Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and is not necessary. 
The Court of Appeals, has already applied the law to the facts of 
this case. (See opinion at pages 3 and 4 of the decision.) The 
Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's decision and has held 
that: (1), the petitioner did authorize the contractor to 
perform the work; (2), for his benefit; and (3), that the 
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respondent dealt with this contractor without knowledge of any 
limitation on this authority; and (4), wasf therefore, entitled 
to the protections of the lien law. 
CONCLUSION 
Certiorari should not be granted. The Court of Appeals 
decision is consistent with well established law of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Petitioner does not seek a change of the law of 
the casef but only seeks further review of the facts of the case 
on issues not raised to the Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *£~ day of March, 1989. 
^ W ^ fifa/* i 
STEVEN F. ALDER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed to John W. Call, Attorney for 
William G. Call and Gene S. Call, 320 South 500 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102, on this JkdL-A&l of March, 1989. 
/(j//uL<, ffitfZ/ti'. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Claron D. Bailey, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v* 
William G. Call and Gene S. Call, 
Defendants and Respondents* 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870203-CA 
F I L E D 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. *|AW191QQQ 
%iakmLm^==^ 
MaryT Noonan 
B I L L I N G S , J u d g e : V Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Appellant Claron Bailey ("Bailey") appeals the trial 
court*s refusal to enforce his mechanics lien against real 
property owned by respondents William and Gene Call ("Call"). 
Bailey also challenges the trial court's award of only $1,800 
in damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 and -2 
(1986),* for Call's failure to obtain a bond. Finally, 
Bailey challenges the court's refusal to award him attorney 
fees. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
In April 1985, Call was repairing the roof of his carpet 
and furniture store. A customer, Mr. Leroy Gurule ("Gurule"), 
claimed he could supply the ceiling tiles, grids and other 
materials required for repairs at a very low cost. Call and 
Gurule entered into an agreement whereby Gurule would supply 
the materials. Call claims he understood the materials were to 
be supplied from Gurulecs stock, or brought in by bulk delivery 
to save Call money. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1, -2 (1986), were repealed in 1987. 
However, the changes are not relevant to our decision as we 
decide the case on an alternative basis. 
Instead, Gurule ordered the materials on open account from 
Bailey. All invoices stated the materials were for 
"Mastercraft Warehouse/" Call's carpet and furniture store/ and 
that is where the materials were delivered. Call claims he 
personally was not aware the materials were purchased from 
Bailey until the job was completed and Call had partially paid 
Gurule. However, an employee of Call testified he knew the 
materials were coming from Bailey. The trial court found the 
reasonable value of the materials sold to Gurule and installed 
as improvements to Call's real property was $3/327.90. 
When Bailey did not receive payment for the materials/ he 
filed a valid mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-3 (1986)/ and subsequently brought this action to 
foreclose the lien or, alternatively, impose liability on Call 
pursuant to the bond provision of Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 
(1986). The trial court held that Gurule# as Call's agent, had 
no authority to order the materials from Bailey and thus Bailey 
could not foreclose his mechanic's lien. However/ the trial 
court entered judgment for $1#800 together with costs and 
interest against Call since Call had not required Gurule to 
provide a bond to protect materialmen/ as required under Utah 
Code Ann. § 14-2-1 (1986). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for findings of fact entered by a 
trial court in a non-jury proceeding is set forth in Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a), which provides, in pertinent part: 
Findings of fact/ whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence/ shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
However, we review a trial court's conclusions of law under 
a correction of error standard. Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 
579/ 580-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). 
MECHANICS' LIENS 
The trial court found Call and Gurule had agreed that all 
materials would be provided from Gurule9s inventory. Based on 
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this finding, the court concluded that Gurule was acting in 
excess of his authority when he purchased materials from 
Bailey, precluding foreclosure of Bailey's mechanic's lien. On 
appeal, Bailey contends neither the facts nor the law support 
such a limitation on Gurule's authority. We agree. 
The controlling statutory provision provides, with our 
emphasis: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all 
persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or 
equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any premises 
in any manner . . . shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service, performed 
labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of 
the owner <?r of any other person acting by 
his authority as agent« contractori or 
otherwiset 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1986). The issue is whether Bailey 
provided materials "at the instance of the owner (Call) or of 
any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor 
or otherwise." 
The mechanics' lien statute "is intended and designed to 
prevent the owner of land from taking the benefits of 
improvements placed on his property without paying for the 
labor and material that went into them." Frehner v. Morton. 18 
Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967). The statute is to 
protect laborers and materialmen who enhance the value of the 
property, and to effectuate that purpose, we construe the 
statute broadly. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco. 648 
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court, discussing an agent's authority to 
bind the owner/principal under the mechanics' lien statute, has 
stated "the facts of the transaction must be explored. . . . 
[T]he courts have often gone beyond the agreement and into the 
whole circumstances,... in order to find the answer." 
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Interiors Contracting Inc. 648 P.2d at 1387 (quoting Utlev v. 
Wear, 323 S.W.2d 787, 792-93 (Mo. App. I960)). In making this 
evaluation, "[s]o long as it can be found that the [contractor] 
performed the work at the instance of [the owner] under an 
express or implied contract . . . the lien is valid." Duoaer 
v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977). If it appears the 
improvements are for the benefit of the owner, and performed at 
the instance of the owner1s agent, "then it can be said with 
justice that the [contractor] in such case is acting for the 
[owner].- Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 
464 P.2d 387, 390 (1970). 
In Interiors Contracting Inc., the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the liability of a lessor for contracts made by a 
lessee for improvements to the lessor's real property. 648 
P.2d at 1386-87. The written lease between the lessor and 
lessee expressly required all improvements to be made at the 
lessee's expense and required the lessee to promptly pay all 
contractors and materialmen. The issue, as in this case, was 
whether the limitation on the lessee's agency precluded lien 
liability on the lessor's/owner's fee interest. The Court 
found this express limitation of authority in the lease 
agreement "cannot override the effect of the mechanics' lien 
law as to persons not a party to the lease." !£• Thus, the 
limited agency between the owner and the agent was not the 
decisive factor. Rather, the Court focused on the benefits 
conferred upon the owner. id. Accord Metals Mfg. Co. v. Bank 
of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914, 915 (1964) ("[I]t 
would seem to be unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude that 
such parties by agreement among themselves, could bind third 
party suppliers of materials to the terms of an agreement to 
which such suppliers were not privies and the terms of which 
they do not know."). 
Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have 
held that the owner consent required by a mechanics' lien 
statute is merely authority to commence work on improvements. 
Once the owner gives authority to his contractor agent to begin 
work, secret limitations as to the price or nature of the work 
are an ineffective defense against a mechanic's lien. For 
example, in Vickerv v. Richardson, 189 Mass. 53, 75 N.E. 136 
(Mass. 1905), the Massachusetts Supreme Court analyzed an 
owner's defense to a mechanic's lien. The architect had been 
given express limitations on the amount of money he was 
authorized to spend for improvements. Contrary to these 
express limitations, the architect engaged a contractor to 
build for an amount in excess of the authorized limit. The 
court upheld the contractor's lien on the owner's property, 
stating: 
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[I]t is claimed that this implied 
authority, although it empowered [the 
architect] to make . . . contracts/ did 
not confer any authority to bind the 
[owner] to pay an increased price, as [the 
architect] was limited to the amount 
specified in the contract with [the 
owner].... The consent given, however, 
is to the performance of the work, not to 
the lien, or the amount for which, under 
i t , the interest of the owner in the lanfl 
cgn be cfrgrgeflt 
Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
With these principles in mind, we review the trial court's 
refusal to foreclose Bailey's mechanic's lien. It is 
undisputed that Bailey was unaware of any agreement between 
Call and Gurule limiting Gurule's authority to purchase 
materials. Accordingly, under the precedent previously 
discussed, even if the evidence supports the trial court's 
finding that Gurule was to supply the materials from his own 
inventory, this limitation does not preclude foreclosure of 
Bailey's mechanic's lien. 
If, as in Interiors Contracting Inc., an express limitation 
in a lease cannot protect a lessor/owner from lien liability, 
it necessarily follows that a verbal understanding cannot limit 
the lien liability of an owner against a materialman who, in 
good faith, supplied products to the contractor to benefit the 
owner's property. 
The trial court's legal conclusion that Gurule could not 
bind Call as owner of the property is in error. Gurule was an 
agent authorized to furnish materials to improve Call's 
property, under the mechanics' lien statute. Gurule purchased 
$3,327.90 in materials from Bailey which directly benefited 
Call's property, and Bailey was not paid for these materials. 
Bailey properly filed a mechanic's lien and is entitled to its 
foreclosure. Call could not limit Gurule's authority to the 
detriment of Bailey, a third party supplier not privy to 
Gurule's and Call's original conversation. Call's consent and 
authorization under,the mechanics' lien statute went to the 
performance of the work, not to the source of the materials• 
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We reverse the trial court and award Bailey $3,327.90 under 
his mechanic's lien claim.2 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The second issue on appeal is the trial court's denial of 
Bailey's claim for attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
(1988) provides: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee# to be fixed by the court/ 
which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. 
Because of our decision allowing Bailey to foreclose his 
mechanic's lien# we hold he is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney fee. Accordingly/ we reverse and remand for the 
determination of a reasonable attorney fee under § 38-1-18. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Judith M. Billings/ Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson^Judge 
ORME, J. (concurring specially): 
I agree with what is said in the main opinion about the 
applicability of the mechanics' lien statute and Bailey's right 
to foreclose his lien. I am troubled by the result/ however, in 
that the adjudged amount of Bailey's lien# $3/327.90/ greatly 
exceeds the amount Call agreed to pay Gurule for the 
2. Based upon our conclusion that Bailey's mechanic's lien can 
be foreclosed against Call/ it is unnecessary to reach the 
issues Bailey raises under the bond statute. 
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materials.1 As Call had a deal to procure those materials 
for much less, it strikes me as unfair to impose this full 
amount on Call. Call had no knowledge of Bailey and no control 
over him. Indeed# Callus contract with Gurule specifically 
required Gurule to supply the materials himself, on favorable 
terms. Nor do I see how Call could have done anything to 
protect himself—short of calling all construction material 
suppliers in the West and advising them of the fact Gurule had 
no authority to purchase materials from them for use in Call's 
project. As a matter of fairness, I think Bailey's lien should 
be limited, aside from recoverable fees and costs, to the 
amount Call contracted to pay for the materials. 
Indeed, a number of reported cases have held that the 
amount of a subcontractor's or supplier's lien is limited by 
the amount owed on the contract between the owner and 
contractor. £g£, etqt, WestinqhPMSe EleCt SUPPLY COti InQf v, 
Electromech. Inc., 119 N.H. 833, 409 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1979); 
Cashwav Lumber Co. v. Lanaston, 479 P.2d 582, 586 (Okla. 
1970). "This limitation is demanded as a matter of simple 
justice and expediency. The owner, having direct relation with 
the contractor, knows what his liablity to him is. Having no 
such relation with the subcontractor, he does not know what the 
contractor's liability to the subcontractor is." Westinqhouse 
Electric, 409 A.2d at 1143 (quoting Boulia-Gorell Lumber v. 
East Coast Pealty CQ,, 84 N.H. 174, 148 A. 28, 31 (1929)). 
"The purpose of limiting a subcontractor's lien, therefore, is 
to protect the owner from unknown liability to the 
subcontractor or materialman and from liability for payments in 
excess of the amounts owed to the general contractor." 409 
A.2d at 1144. 
However, it must be conceded that these cases turn on 
particular statutory provisions. Likewise, an old Utah case is 
consistent with the notion that a supplier's or subcontractor's 
lien may not exceed the amount the property owner contracted to 
pay. See Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah 130, 66 
P. 779, 781 (1901) ("subcontractor, by virtue of the original 
contract, is entitled, under his subcontract, to a lien, within 
the limit of the original contract price"). But Sierra also 
turned, in relevant part, on a statutory provision which 
appears to have been deleted at some point from the Utah Code 
and is not in the present version of our mechanics' lien 
1. That amount was $2,600 according to Call's uncontroverted 
testimony. The findings prepared by Bailey's counsel 
mistakenly recite a figure of $1,800. 
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statute.2 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 (1988). 
Unfortunately, in my view, the statutory scheme currently 
in effect in Utah does not protect a property owner from 
potentially paying more to a subcontractor or supplier than he 
agreed to pay to his contractor. On the contrary, the property 
owner is only protected to the extent that he cannot be liened 
for more than the "value" of the materials. Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-3 (1988). Such protection is no doubt sufficient in the 
routine case, but it is inadequate in a case like this one, 
where a property owner contracts for materials at greatly 
discounted prices and ends up being liable for the full value 
of those materials ^ through no fault of his own. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
2. The provision, Rev. Stat. § 1373, provided in part as 
follows: "In case of a contract between an owner and a 
contractor, the lien shall extend to the entire price, and such 
contract shall operate as a lien in favor of all persons except 
the contractor to the extent of the whole contract price . . . , 
Sierra, 66 P. at 781. 
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The cover sheet and full text of the Utah Court of 
Appeals Opinion in this case is found in the Appendix hereto and 
is also published in 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Jan. 12, 1989). 
JURISDICTION 
(1) The Court of Appeals opinion in Case No. 370203-CA 
was filed January 12, 1989, and a copy of the opinion was mailed 
to counsel for the parties on January 13, 1989. 
(2) Section 78-2-2, Utah Code, confers upon this Court 
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in this matter. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES 
1. Mechanic's Liens Statutes. 
Utah Code Section 38-1-3. 
Those entitled to lien - What may be attached. 
Contractors, suocontractors and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have 
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, 
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall 
have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented 
materials or equipment for the value of the service tendered, 
labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by 
each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any 
other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the 
owner may have in the property. 
2. Bond Law Statutes. 
Utah Code Section 14-2-2 (former statute, prior to 1987 
revis ion). Failure to require bond — Direct Liability — 
Limitation of actions.: 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who 
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit 
the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all 
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the 
contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or 
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices 
agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be 
commenced within one year from the last date the last materials 
were furnished or the labor performed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Claron Bailey brought this action in Salt Lake Fifth 
Circuit Court to foreclose a mechanic's lien he had filed against 
property owned by William G. Call and Gene S. Call. Bailey had 
supplied material used in the repair of Call's commercial 
building. Mr. Call had contracted with LeRoy Gurule to supply the 
material from Gurule's own warehouse. Thereafter, Gurule, without 
Call's knowledge, ootained the materials from Bailey. 
Following trial in Circuit Court, the trial court denied 
Bailey recovery under the mechanic's lien statute, citing the 
specific limitation of authority given Gurule (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, found at Record 36 7, specifically paragraph 
2 of the Conclusions of Law, at R.373). Instead, the trial court 
awarded Bailey judgment pursuant to the bond statute and limited 
Bailey's recovery to the price agreed upon between Call and Bailey 
(R. 373-374). 
Bailey appealed the trial court's decision and the Court 
of Appeals reversed, holding that "Call's consent and 
authorization under the mechanic's lien statute went to the 
performance of the work, not to the source of the materials", 100 
Utah Adv. Rep 11, at 12 (see also the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 5, in the Appendix). 
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Statement of the Facts 
In April 1985, Mr. Call had a conversation with a 
customer in his store who noticed ceiling repairs were necessary 
in the building. The customer, LeRoy Gurule, represented that he 
bought materials by the truckload direct from manufacturers and 
could supply materials at a favorable price. Accordingly, Gurule 
was commissioned to supply the material from his own warehouses 
(R. 348-351). 
Unbeknownst to Call, Gurule contacted Claron Bailey, also 
a supplier of the necessary material, to arrange delivery of the 
needed material to Call's building (R. 352, 224-225). The trial 
court found that Call was not aware of the source of the material 
until after the last delivery (R. 371-372, paragraph 23, 24 and 
25). 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has not had an opportunity to address the 
specific scope of language found in Section 33-1-3, in the factual 
context presented by this case, specifically the authority of an 
agent to act in behalf of the owner. The trial judge found that 
the limitation present in the agreement between Call and Gurule, 
i.e. that Gurule would supply the material from his own stock, 
precluded Bailey from recovering under the mechanic's lien statute 
because Gurule acted without authority. However, Section 38-1-3 
contains no such limitations on the scope of the authority of a 
person or agent acting on behalf of the owner. The Court of 
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Appeals' decision suggest that a supplier need not verify the 
authority of an agent before supplying material in order to 
recover the full value of the materials under the mechanic lien 
statute. 
The Utah Appeals Court misreads the effect of this 
Court's holding in Interior's Contractingy Inc. v. Navalco, 648 
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982). The Appeals Court focused only on language 
in that opinion that dealt with the rights and liabilites of 
sub-lessors and sub-lessees. The Appeals Court, however, ignored 
the holding in which reversed a judgment awarded against the owner 
of the building, citing a lack: of evidence that the owner had 
authorized the specific work to be done. Indeed, this Court 
stated: 
Navalco's [the owner] knowledge and acquiescence 
in the making of the improvements is not sufficient 
to charge the fee owner's interest with a mechanic 
lien, see Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 
23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970), especially 
since Navalco was a remote lessor and the master 
lease between Navalco and Green Acres [lessee/ 
sublessor] did not contemplate that the premises 
were to be used as a restaurant. 648 P.2d 1382 at 1390. 
Thus this Court has upheld the principle applied by the 
trial court that an owner is not always liable for the value of 
work or materials under the mechanic's lien statute particularly 
where the owner has not given specific authority for specific 
work, or as in this case, materials. 
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This reasoning is directly contrary to the Court of 
Appeals reasoning in its opinion and the case cited by the Court 
of Appeals in support of this opinion, Vickery v. Richardson, 189 
Mass. 53, 75 M.E. 136 (1905). Other cases cited by the Court 
of Appeals actually support the trial court's judgment. In 
Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967), the facts 
show that the owner was properly charged with liability under the 
mechanic's lien statute because he knew and gave authority to his 
daughter to engage the services of the plaintiff architect. In 
fact, this Court cited the owner's authorization of the work and 
the person who did the work as controlling in its decision. 424 
P.2d, at 447. 
In Metals Mfg. Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 
395 P.2d 914 (1954), this Court held that the occupier of the 
subject building, the lessee bank, knew in advance the contractor 
had obtained specific materials from a supplier. This Court 
therefore held that the intention and the knowledge of the parties 
properly resulted in a valid bond claim against the bank. 
The grounds for reversing the trial court cited by the 
Appeals Court are directly contrary to rulings by this court 
dealing with general principles of agency law. In a commercial 
code case involving banks, Zions First National Bank v. 
Clark Clinic Corp, 762 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1988), this court has 
noted: 
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....It is well established that the mere fact 
that an employee has managerial status and is 
in charge of a company's office does not 
entitle third persons to assume that he had 
the authority to execute or endorse negotiable 
paper belonging to his employer. 762 P.2d 1090 
at 1095 (quoting Confederate Welding v. Bank 
of Mid-South, 453 So. 2d 1370, at 1375 (La. App. 
1984). 
The Court of Appeals, in an attempt to protect 
materialmen and sub-contractors at all costs, has ignored the 
language of the mechanic's lien statute by superimposing its 
notion of what Call's agreement with Gurule should have meant, 
instead of simply applying the facts to the law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident that in the other cases before this Court, 
where bond or lien claimants have been successful, this Court has 
always approved or disapproved those claims by looking at all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding an owner's authority given to 
a contractor or supplier. That authority has never been limited 
by any decision of this Court. The ruling by the Utah Court of 
Appeals herein is thus in conflict with lien and agency 
principles enunciated by this Court in other cases. Thus, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is in conflict with 
this Court or at the very least is in an area of law that should 
be resolved clearly and distinctly by this Court. 
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DATED this of February, 1989. 
JOHN W. CALL A 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /*p day of February, 
1989, four true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Steven F. Adler, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
220 East 3900 South - #16 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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APPENDIX 
Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion 
Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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Claron D. Bailey, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 870203-CA 
William G. Call and 
Gene S. Call, 
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PARTIES: 
Steven F. Alder (Argued) 
Attorney for Appellant 
220 East 3900 South, Suite 16 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
John W. Call (Argued) 
Attorney for Respondents 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
TRIAL JUDGE: 
Hon. Michael J. Hutchings 
Salt Lake City 
Fifth Circuit Court 
451 So. 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
December 12, 1989 OPINION 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the circuit 
court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in 
the opinion filed herein. 
Opinion of the Court by JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge; NORMAN H. 
JACKSON, Judge concurs. GREGORY K. ORME, Judge concurring 
specially. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally 
delivered to each of the above parties. 
erase Manager 
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Claron D. Bailey, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
William G. Call and Gene S. Call, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No, 870203-CA 
F I L E D 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. AN 121983 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
MaryT Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court ot Appeals 
Appellant Claron Bailey (-Bailey-) appeals the trial 
court's refusal to enforce his mechanic*s lien against real 
property owned by respondents William and Gene Call ("Call"). 
Bailey also challenges the trial courtfs award of only $1,800 
in damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 and -2 
(1986),* for Call's failure to obtain a bond. Finally, 
Bailey challenges the court's refusal to award him attorney 
fees. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
In April 1985, Call was repairing the roof of his carpet 
and furniture store. A customer, Mr. Leroy Gurule ("Gurule"), 
claimed he could supply the ceiling tiles, grids and other 
materials required for repairs at a very low cost. Call and 
Gurule entered into an agreement whereby Gurule would supply 
the materials. Call claims he understood the materials were to 
be supplied from Gurule*s stock, or brought in by bulk delivery 
to save Call money. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1, -2 (1986), were repealed in 1987, 
However, the changes are not relevant to our decision as we 
decide the case on an alternative basis. 
Instead/ Gurule ordered the materials on open account from 
Bailey. All invoices stated the materials were for 
"Mastercraft Warehouse/H Call's carpet and furniture store, and 
that is where the materials were delivered. Call claims he 
personally was not aware the materials were purchased from 
Bailey until the job was completed and Call had partially paid 
Gurule. However# an employee of Call testified he knew the 
materials were coming from Bailey. The trial court found the 
reasonable value of the materials sold to Gurule and installed 
as improvements to Callus real property was $3/327.90. 
When Bailey did not receive payment for the materials, he 
filed a valid mechanicfs lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-3 (1986)/ and subsequently brought this action to 
foreclose the lien or, alternatively, impose liability on Call 
pursuant to the bond provision of Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 
(1986). The trial court held that Gurule/ as Call's agent/ had 
no authority to order the materials from Bailey and thus Bailey 
could not foreclose his mechanic's lien. However, the trial 
court entered judgment for $1/800 together with costs and 
interest against Call since Call had not required Gurule to 
provide a bond to protect materialmen/ as required under Utah 
Code Ann. § 14-2-1 (1986). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for findings of fact entered by a 
trial court in a non-jury proceeding is set forth in Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a)/ which provides, in pertinent part: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
However# we review a trial court's conclusions of law under 
a correction of error standard. Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 
579/ 580-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068/ 1070 (Utah 1985)). 
MECHANICS' LIENS 
The trial court found Call and Gurule had agreed that all 
materials would be provided from Gurule's inventory. Based on 
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this finding, the court concluded that Gurule was acting in 
excess of his authority when he purchased materials from 
Bailey, precluding foreclosure of Bailey's mechanic's lien. On 
appeal, Bailey contends neither the facts nor the law support 
such a limitation on Gurule#s authority. We agree. 
The controlling statutory provision provides, with our 
emphasis: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all 
persons performing any services or 
furnishing or renting any materials or 
equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any premises 
in any manner . . . shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service, performed 
labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service 
rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each 
respectively, whether at the instance of 
the owner or of any other person acting bv 
his authority as agent, contractor, or 
Otherwiset 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1986). The issue is whether Bailey 
provided materials "at the instance of the owner (Call) or of 
any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor 
or otherwise." 
The mechanics' lien statute "is intended and designed to 
prevent the owner of land from taking the benefits of 
improvements placed on his property without paying for the 
labor and material that went into them." Frehner v. Morton. 18 
Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967). The statute is to 
protect laborers and materialmen who enhance the value of the 
property, and to effectuate that purpose, we construe the 
statute broadly. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court, discussing an agent*s authority to 
bind the owner/principal under the mechanics1 lien statute, has 
stated "the facts of the transaction must be explored. . . . 
[T]he courts have often gone beyond the agreement and into the 
whole circumstances.... in order to find the answer." 
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Interiors Contracting Inc., 648 P.2d at 1387 (quoting Utley v. 
Wear, 323 S.W.2d 787, 792-93 (Mo. App. I960)). In making this 
evaluation, "[s]o long as it can be found that the [contractor] 
performed the work at the instance of. [the owner] under an 
express or implied contract . . . the lien is valid." Duaaer 
v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977). If it appears the 
improvements are for the benefit of the owner, and performed at 
the instance of the owner1s agent, "then it can be said with 
justice that the [contractor] in such case is acting for the 
[owner]." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 
464 P.2d 387, 390 (1970). 
In Interiors Contracting Inc., the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the liability of a lessor for contracts made by a 
lessee for improvements to the lessor's real property. 648 
P.2d at 1386-87. The written lease between the lessor and 
lessee expressly required all improvements to be made at the 
lessee*s expense and required the lessee to promptly pay all 
contractors and materialmen. The issue, as in this case, was 
whether the limitation on the lessee"s agency precluded lien 
liability on the lessor*s/owner*s fee interest. The Court 
found this express limitation of authority in the lease 
agreement "cannot override the effect of the mechanics* lien 
law as to persons not a party to the lease." 111. Thus, the 
limited agency between the owner and the agent was not the 
decisive factor. Rather, the Court focused on the benefits 
conferred upon the owner. IcJ. Accord Metals Mfg. Co. v. Bank 
of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914, 915 (1964) ("[I]t 
would seem to be unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude that 
such parties by agreement among themselves, could bind third 
party suppliers of materials to the terms of an agreement to 
which such suppliers were not privies and the terms of which 
they do not know."). 
Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have 
held that the owner consent required by a mechanics* lien 
statute is merely authority to commence work on improvements. 
Once the owner gives authority to his contractor agent to begin 
work, secret limitations as to the price or nature of the work 
are an ineffective defense against a mechanic's lien. For 
example, in Vickerv v. Richardson. 189 Mass. 53, 75 N.E. 136 
(Mass. 1905), the Massachusetts Supreme Court analyzed an 
owner's defense to a mechanic's lien. The architect had been 
given express limitations on the amount of money he was 
authorized to spend for improvements. Contrary to these 
express limitations, the architect engaged a contractor to 
build for an amount in excess of the authorized limit. The 
court upheld the contractor*s lien on the owner*s property, 
stating: 
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[I]t is claimed that this implied 
authority/ although it empowered [the 
architect] to make . . . contracts/ did 
not confer any authority to bind the 
[owner] to pay an increased price# as [the 
architect] was limited to the amount 
specified in the contract with [the 
o w n e r ] . . . . The consent given, however, 
JS to the performance Of the work, not to 
the lien, or the amount for which, under 
it, the interest of the owner in the land 
can be charged. 
Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
With these principles in mind/ we review the trial court's 
refusal to foreclose Bailey's mechanic's lien. It is 
undisputed that Bailey was unaware of any agreement between 
Call and Gurule limiting Gurule's authority to purchase 
materials. Accordingly, under the precedent previously 
discussed/ even if the evidence supports the trial court's 
finding that Gurule was to supply the materials from his own 
inventory/ this limitation does not preclude foreclosure of 
Bailey's mechanic's lien. 
If/ as in Interiors Contracting Inc.. an express limitation 
in a lease cannot protect a lessor/owner from lien liability, 
it necessarily follows that a verbal understanding cannot limit 
the lien liability of an owner against a materialman who, in 
good faith/ supplied products to the contractor to benefit the 
owner's property. 
The trial court's legal conclusion that Gurule could not 
bind Call as owner of the property is in error. Gurule was an 
agent authorized to furnish materials to improve Call's 
property/ under the mechanics' lien statute. Gurule purchased 
$3/327.90 in materials from Bailey which directly benefited 
Call's property/ and Bailey was not paid for these materials. 
Bailey properly filed a mechanic's lien and is entitled to its 
foreclosure. Call could not limit Gurule's authority to the 
detriment of Bailey# a third party supplier not privy to 
Gurule's and Call's original conversation. Call's consent and 
authorization under.the mechanics' lien statute went to the 
performance of the work, not to the source of the materials. 
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We reverse the trial court and award Bailey $3,327.90 under 
his mechanic's lien claim.2 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The second issue on appeal is the trial court's denial of 
Bailey's claim for attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
(1988) provides: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. 
Because of our decision allowing Bailey to foreclose his 
mechanic's lien, we hold, he is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney fee. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the 
determination of a reasonable attorney fee under § 38-1-18. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson^uudge 
ORME, J. (concurring specially): 
I agree with what is said in the main opinion about the 
applicability of the mechanics' lien statute and Bailey's right 
to foreclose his lien. I am troubled by the result, however, in 
that the adjudged amount of Bailey's lien, $3,327.90, greatly 
exceeds the amount Call agreed to pay Gurule for the 
2. Based upon our conclusion that Bailey's mechanic's lien can 
be foreclosed against Call, it is unnecessary to reach the 
issues Bailey raises under the bond statute. 
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materials.1 As Call had a deal to procure those materials 
for much less, it strikes me as unfair to impose this full 
amount on Call. Call had no knowledge of Bailey and no control 
over him. Indeed, Call's contract with Gurule specifically 
required Gurule to supply the materials himself, on favorable 
terms. Nor do I see how Call could have done anything to 
protect himself—short of calling all construction material 
suppliers in the West and advising them of the fact Gurule had 
no authority to purchase materials from them for use in Call's 
project. As a matter of fairness, I think Bailey's lien should 
be limited, aside from recoverable fees and costs, to the 
amount Call contracted to pay for the materials. 
Indeed, a number of reported cases have held that the 
amount of a subcontractor's or supplier's lien is limited by 
the amount owed on the contract between the owner and 
contractor. See, e.g., Westinahouse Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. 
Electromech, Inc., 119 N.H. 833, 409 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1979); 
Cashwav Lumber Co. v. Lanqston, 479 P.2d 582, 586 (Okla. 
1970). This limitation is demanded as a matter of simple 
justice and expediency. The owner, having direct relation with 
the contractor, knows what his liablity to him is. Having no 
such relation with the subcontractor, he does not know what the 
contractor's liability to the subcontractor is." Westinahouse 
Electric, 409 A.2d at 1143 (quoting Boulia-Gorell Lumber v. 
East Coast Realty Co., 84 N.H. 174, 148 A. 28, 31 (1929)). 
-The purpose of limiting a subcontractor's lien, therefore, is 
to protect the owner from unknown liability to the 
subcontractor or materialman and from liability for payments in 
excess of the amounts owed to the general contractor." 409 
A.2d at 1144. 
However, it must be conceded that these cases turn on 
particular statutory provisions. Likewise, an old Utah case is 
consistent with the notion that a supplier's or subcontractor's 
lien may not exceed the amount the property owner contracted to 
pay. See Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah 130, 66 
P. 779, 781 (1901) ("subcontractor, by virtue of the original 
contract, is entitled, under his subcontract, to a lien, within 
the limit of the original contract price"). But Sierra also 
turned, in relevant part, on a statutory provision which 
appears to have been deleted at some point from the Utah Code 
and is not in the present version of our mechanics' lien 
1. That amount was $2,600 according to Call's uncontroverted 
testimony. The findings prepared by Bailey's counsel 
mistakenly recite a figure of $1,800. 
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statute.2 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 (1988). 
Unfortunately, in my view, the statutory scheme currently 
in effect in Utah does not protect a property owner from 
potentially paying more to a subcontractor or supplier than he 
agreed to pay to his contractor. On the contrary, the property 
owner is only protected to the extent that he cannot be liened 
for more than the -value" of the materials. Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-3 (1988). Such protection is no doubt sufficient in the 
routine case, but it is inadequate in a case like this one, 
where a property owner contracts for materials at greatly 
discounted prices and ends up being liable for the full value 
of those materials through no fault of his own. 
Gregoi^r K. Orme, Judge 
2. The provision, Rev. Stat. § 1373, provided in part as 
follows: wIn case of a contract between an owner and a 
contractor, the lien shall extend to the entire price, and such 
contract shall operate as a lien in favor of all persons except 
the contractor to the extent of the whole contract price . . . « 
Sierra, 66 P. at 781. 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAJtj'.i\\>.;.'•;.;. "•'.'.". 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE'DEPARTMENT 
CLARON D. BAILEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM G. CALL and GENE S. 
CALL, 
Defendants. 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 85-CV-10254 
The foregoing matter, having cone on for trial before the 
Honorable Michael Hutchings on the £S~ day of fc£"+y ~*f / ^ f T ^ ^ j 
1986, plaintiff being present and represented by counsel Steven F. 
Alder, defendant William G. Call being present and represented by 
counsel John w. Call. The defendant Gene S. Call was served but 
not present was represented by John VI. Call and bound by the 
proceedings by stipulation of counsel. The court having heard 
evidence and argument of counsel; 
NOW THEREFORE makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendants William G. Cell and Gene S. Call are the 
owners of real property in Salt Lake County, State of Utah which 
is described as follows: 
* / — 
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PARCEL NO. 1: 
BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Lot 4, 
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION and running thence 
North 0o01l West 134.29 feet to the point of 
beginning, and running thence West 83 feet; 
thence North 0°01 • East 31.55 feet; thence East 
83 feet; thence South 21.55 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
PARCEL NO. 2: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 248, 
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION, and running thence 
South 0o01f West 71.8 feet; thence West 83 
feet; thence North 0°1• East 71.8 feet; thence 
East 83 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The plaintiff is doing business in Salt Lake County as a 
supplier of drywall materials. 
3. The subject matter of this action included the foreclosure 
of a lien against the above-described property and therefore, this 
court has proper jurisdiction of the subject matter of this 
dispute. 
4. While the defendants were owners of the above-described 
property, they entered into a contract with a Mr. Roy Gurule for 
the construction of certain improvements upon the above-described 
real property. The improvements included: 
a) the placement of sheetrock over damaged portions of 
the ceiling; 
b) the hanging of a suspended grid ceiling and the 
placement of the ceiling tiles within the grid; 
c) the suspension and placement of fluorescent light 
panels within the grids. 
SiS 
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5. On or about the 26th of April, 1985, the plaintiff v;as 
contacted by Mr. Roy Gurule and agreed to sell to Mr. Roy Gurule 
certain materials, including the following: 
a) sheetrock 
b) sheetrock mud 
c) suspended ceiling grid and tiles 
d) lighting panels. 
6. The materials purchased by Mr. Roy Gurule from the 
plaintiff were identified by Mr.Gurule or his agents as being 
purchased for the improvement of the defendants1 property. 
7. The agreement between the plaintiff and Mr. Gurule 
provided that the plaintiff would receive payment for these 
materials within thirty days of delivery. 
8. The plaintiff pursuant to said agreement did provide 
materials to Mr. Roy Gurule which were delivered to the 
defendant's address or picked up by Mr. Gurule from the plaintiff. 
9. All materials purchased except some items returned for 
credit were installed in the real property owned by the 
defendants. 
10. Materials were supplied commencing on the 26th day of 
April, 1985 and continuing until the 21st day of May, 1985. 
11. The reasonable and fair market value of the materials 
sold to Mr. Gurule and installed as improvements to the real 
property less credits for items returned was the sum of $3,327.00. 
12. Mr. Roy Gurule failed to make payments on his account to 
the plaintiff despite demands by the plaintiff that he do so. 
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13. Plaintiff made demand for payment upon the defendants and 
the defendants have failed to make payment to the plaintiff 
against the amount ov;ing for materials purchased, 
14. On June 7, 1985, the plaintiff caused to be recorded a 
Notice of Lien against the above-described real property as Entry 
No. 4096078 at Book 5661 , Page 575, at the offices of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder. 
15. Said Notice of Lien was filed in compliance with the 
provisions and requirements of §38-1-7 et seq. U.C.A. as amended. 
16. A copy of said Notice'of Lien was mailed by certified 
mail to the defendants William G. Call and Gene S. Call at 2157 
East 7050 Southf Salt Lake City, Utah within thirty days of the 
recording of the lien. 
17. The lien was properly signed and notarized and otherwise 
complied in form with the statutory requirements to claim a lien 
for improvements to real property. The lien was not compromised 
or satisfied and no other action was pending to foreclose said 
lien against the real property. The plaintiff retained counsel 
for purposes of bringing this action and foreclosing its lien 
rights against the real property. 
18. The contractors son, together with the contractor, did 
provide services at the defendants' property specifically as 
follows: the contractorfs son placed sheetrock over damagedarea 
in the roof of the building and the contractor assisted in the 
loading and stacking of materials at the defendants' building. 
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19. The materials supplied by the plaintiff to the 
defendants' building were either picked up by the contractor from 
the plaintiff's business or were delivered to the defendants' 
property by a third party supplier. 
20. The contractor identified the materials purchased as 
being for the defendants' business property and invoices were 
marked with that identification. 
21. All charges by the contractor (Gurule) for the job so 
identified were separately accounted for by the plaintiff. 
22. The contractor, Roy Gurule, at the time of the initial 
agreement with the defendants verbally represented to the 
defendant William Call that he was a very large contractor and 
could obtain the materials for improvements at a low cost because 
of the large volume of his construction activities. 
23. The defendant William Call reasonably implied from the 
foregoing representations that the contractor would obtain the 
materials from his own stock or his own warehouse and v/ould not be 
purchasing them from a third party. The defendant did not know \ 
that the plaintiff had supplied the subject materials until after I 
they had been supplied and the work completed. I 
24. The plaintiff was not notified by the defendant or the ^ 
or t>y 
contractor either verbally or in writing/the actions of either 
party that the defendant had represented to the owner that he had 
not purchased these materials but had them in his own stock. 
-=7/ 
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25. The defendants never contacted the plaintiff prior to 
thesupplying of materials nor did the plaintiff contact the 
defendants prior to the time that materials had been supplied to \ • 
\ 4 the property, although the plaintiff had knovm the defendants were \ \| 
the recipients of the supplies and knew the address where such ' 
supplies were delivered. 
26. The defendants William G. Call and Gene S. Call failed to 
provide a bond for the improvements as required by §14-2-1 et seq. 
U.C.A. as amended. 
27. The value of the improvements exceeded $2,000.00. 
28. The contractor represented to the defendants that he 
would provide the materials and improvements for a total price of 
$1,800.00. Said amount was the agreed price between the 
defendants and their contractor Roy Gurule for the materials and 
labor supplied. 
29. Contractor further agreed with the defendants to accept a 
reupholstering of certain furniture as partial payment for the 
materials. This couch was later sold by the defendant to cover 
the costs of recoverying it. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAU 
1. The plaintiff properly filed its Noticeof Lien in 
conformance with the requirements of Utah Code §38-1-7 et seq. as 
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amended and properly gave notice by certified mail to the 
defendants within thirty days of the filing thereof. 
2. The authority of defendants contractor was verbally 
limited so as to preclude the defendant from obtaining materials 
from outside of his own warehouse. As a result of such verbal 
limitation, the contractor was without authority to act as the 
owner's agent in purchasing materials for improvements to 
defendants * property. 
3. By virtue of the defendants' lack of agency with the owner 
because of the verbal limitation on the agency of the contractor, 
the defendants are not entitled to foreclose their lien and are 
precluded from recovering attorney's fees in this action as 
related to the lien foreclosure. 
4. The reasonable value of all labor and materials delivered 
to the defendants' property and installed as improvements upon the 
property less all proper offsets and credits is the sum of 
$3,327.90 plus interest. 
5. The defendants failed to obtain a bond as required by the 
provisions of §14-2-1 et seq. U.C.A. as amended. The provisions 
of Paragraph 2.2 provide that any persons subject to the 
provisions of the chapter who shall fail to obtain a good and 
sufficient bond or to exhibit the same as herein required shall be 
personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or 
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performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding however 
in any case the price agreed upon. 
6. The contract between the defendants and the contractor 
called for the contractor to supply labor and materials in the sum 
of $1,800.00. The verbal contract between the defendants and the 
contractor called for the contractor's supply of labor and 
materials in the sum of $1800, although the contract between the 
contractor and his supplier called for a purchase price of S3,327. 
<E 7. By failure of the defendants to obtain a bond for the 
improvements, they are liable/for the value of said improvements ///// 
not to exceed the amount of the contract price betv/een themselves 
and their contractor; to wit, $1,800.00 plus interest. 
8. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendants in the sum of $1,800.00, together with its costs and 
interest from the date the materials were supplied until date of 
judgment at 10% per annum and from the date of judgment until paid 
at 12% per annum. f\ ( 
DATED this ^ / day of 1Kl\/j\/WJ\ , . ::V^r•' , 1987. 
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Approved by: 
W. Call 
rney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
the £«?>*, day of 3tfvrs«*^/ 
rrect CODV of the foregoing FIftD 
I hereby certify that on 
1986, I mailed a true and corre copy IN INGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to John W. Call, Attorney for 
Defendants, Henriksen, Henriksen & Call, 320 South 500 East, 
S.L.C., UT 84102. 
Vfo?7«^777/Sf/5 •^xe/atA^.. 
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